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Léon Walras and the Nobel Peace Prize.
A curious episode in the history of economics is the attempt by León Walras to be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Much of the story can be pieced together from a reading of Walras' correspondence (Jaffé 1965) , and it has been mentioned briefly by several historians of economic thought, e.g. Niehans (1990) . However, there does not appear to exist a full account of the story, including the reception of the proposal by the Norwegian Nobel Committee. To fill this gap is the purpose of the present paper. The episode is interesting because of the light it sheds on Léon Walras' personality and his perception of the significance of his own work.
Background.
The Nobel prizes have their origin in the will of the Swedish inventor and industrialist Alfred Nobel (1833 Nobel ( -1896 . A large part of his fortune went to establish a fund, the interest on which was to provide the financing for five annual prizes, of which one was to be in physics, one in chemistry, one in physiology and medicine and one in literature. The first two of these prizes were to be awarded by the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, the third by Karolinska Institutet, a medical university, and the fourth by the Swedis h Academy (of language and literature). The fifth prize was to be awarded to "the person who shall have done the most for fraternity between nations, for the abolition or reduction of standing armies and for the holding and promotion of peace congresses." The winners of this prize, which became known as the Peace Prize, were, unlike the other four, not to be selected by any Swedish institution, but by "a committee of five persons to be elected by the Norwegian Storting [Parliament]". 1 The reason why Nobel chose to leave the decisions on the Peace Prize to the Norwegians is not clear. He may simply have thought it fair that both countries in the Swedish-Norwegian union should have a share of his prizes, or he may have thought that Norway, as the junior partner in the union and less visible on the international political scene, was less likely to let the selection of the winner be influenced by international power politics.
The first set of prizes was awarded in the autumn of 1901. The winners of the first four Peace prizes were as follows. At the present time the most famous of the early Prize winners is Henry Dunant, the founder of the Red Cross. Passy, Ducommun, Gobat and Cremer were all activists of national and international peace organizations, while the 1904 award started a long tradition of giving the Peace Prize to organizations whose work was judged to be beneficial to the cause of world peace.
This, in brief, was the history of the Nobel Peace Prize as of the spring of 1905, when the nomination of Léon Walras as a candidate took place.
The proposal.
In his chapter on Walras, Niehans (1990, p. 209 ) says that Walras "applied for the Nobel Peace Prize ". Formally, this is not correct, since, by the bylaws of the Prize, no one can nominate himself, and this is accordingly not what he did. However, it is possible to circumvent this rule by encouraging others to propose one, and this was the road taken by Walras. We can get at least some glimpses of the process of nomination by reading a series of letters in volume III of William Jaffé 's edition of Walras' correspondence (1965) 2 .
The story begins with a letter of 13 April, 1905 April, , (no. 1589 In the le tter the nominators say that they would like to call the committee's attention to the claims that M. Walras has to being considered for the Prize. This is followed by the onesentence paragraph 4 :
"M. Walras has devoted the whole of his scientific activity to the science of mathematical economics, of which he is the principal founder."
They go on to state that Walras' devotion to science has perhaps prevented him from receiving the honours that he deserves, and that this is an additional reason for wishing him to receive this recognition of his exceptional scientific merits and irreproachable moral attitude.
It is true that the immediate results of M. Walras' work may not be apparent, but theoretical research is in certain respects more important than practical activities. Its perspectives are longer, and its results are more durable and more certain.
The letter itself does not specify the relevance of Walras' work to the cause of peace. The argument in support of this is set out, however, in an enclosure to the letter, which runs to almost four closely printed pages of the Correspondence; in the following I will refer to this as the Memorandum. A draft of the Memorandum has been preserved in Walras' hand writing, so that he clearly must be considered its principal author, although formally it appears as the work of the three proponents. It gives an interesting view of his thinking both on matters of theory and economic policy, although he obviously presents his work in a light that could be expected to be particularly attractive to the Prize Committee.
In the first paragraph of the Memorandum Walras is proposed as a candidate for the Prize on the basis of "his work in three volumes": Perhaps the most powerful of all means to promote and maintain the fraternity between nations, the Memorandum argues, is the move towards free international trade ("libre échange international"). Interestingly, this basic proposition is not spelt out in any detail; perhaps the author or authors consider it to be self-evident. Instead, the document goes on to list other benefits from free trade: It provides access to a wide range of goods for all countries and will allow the suppression not only of war, but also of hunger. Accordingly, it concludes, the proponents have no difficulty in pronouncing any effort to promote free international trade to be in perfect agreement with the spirit of the Nobel Peace Prize.
There are two ways to work for the promotion of free trade. There is the practical approach, which works through the removal of barriers to trade, and the theoretical or scientific approach which is concerned with the clarification of the serious and complex questions that arise in the study of free trade. The second approach is of primary importance, because the theory of free trade still lacks a scientific basis.
What are the barriers to free trade? The memorandum argues that too much attention tends to be given to protective tariffs, while fiscal charges 5 are just as important; e.g. English taxes on tea, sugar, tobacco and wine are also detrimental to trade, but this is hardly realized by free traders like Cobden and Bright. Thus, in the interests of promoting free trade, both tariffs and indirect taxes ought to be abolished. But this recommendation requires the theory to answer the following two questions:
I. How can one collect the revenue of the state without fiscal charges and tariffs of any sort?
II. Can protective tariffs be abolished without damage to industry and the wealth of the country?
The proponents do not hesitate to say that M. Walras' work has been completely devoted to answering these questions. He has clearly not had the newly established Nobel Prize in mind, since his work extends over a period of forty years; while he has written with the sole purpose of establishing the scientific solution to the "social economic question", he has by the same stroke established the solution to the question of free trade.
Because the destiny of man is to live in societies, i.e. as individuals in a state, it is necessary that the state subsists. But if the economic basis of the state is taxes and tariffs, there is a contradiction between the subsistence of the state and the economic interests of society.
Happily, this contradiction is only apparent. Pure scientific economics has established that there are two natural sources of wealth: The services of the human faculties and the services of the earth ("la terre"). A philosophic social economics ("une économie social philosophique") attributes to the individual the wages of his labour and to the state the rent on the land. There is therefore no need for fiscal charges and tariffs that distort the conditions for free trade. Free competition achieves this for the individuals within a nation, and it is evident that the same result must hold for individuals within a customs union or the world as a whole.
The text makes a number of supporting references to Walras' books, especially to the Eléments d'économie politique pure, and also to the main works of Ricardo and Mill, although these authors were not as rigorous as Walras. It also refers to his Etudes d'économie politique appliquée for the proposition that free trade leads to the economic unification of the world, the suppression of war, the settlement of international conflicts by arbitrage, and a number of other benefits, including the nationalization of land and the abolition of all import duties. The nationalization of land enables the state to collect all rents, thereby financing its activities without the help of taxes and tariffs.
It is important to note, the Memorandum continues, that the social and political economy on which these propositions rest, are derived from pure economics, a field that studies the laws of economics by a new method, viz. the mathematical one. 1905, a move which had caused critical reactions from the governments of the major European powers, and the Norwegian leaders must have felt a strong need to create some international goodwill for themselves. From this point of view, awarding the prize to the American president must have seemed like an attractive proposition to the Committee, and particularly to its chairman, Jørgen Løvland -who also happened to be minister of foreign affairs 14 .
level it seems rather a pathetic story of a great scientist who was carried away by his desire for honours and recognition. What he arguably did was to dress up his work to make it seem relevant for a Prize designed to award activities that were in reality totally different from his own. Neither does the strategy that he chose to advance his candidacy shed a flattering light on his personality; he circumvented the rule that no-one can propose himself by a manoeuvre that made the proposal look as if it originated with his colleagues in Lausanne, although he had in fact written it himself. Moreover, the proposal seemed doomed to failure from the very beginning, since he ought to have understood that he had in fact no chances of winning the Prize. It is impossible to deny that these are essential aspects of the story. But with respect to the last point, the situation facing Walras in 1905 is very different from how it appears to us when we consider the episode from the vantage point of the present time. We are necessarily influenced by our knowledge of the last one hundred years of the history of the Prize, and we may therefore come to judge Walras' behaviour in a manner which is too critical of his judgement, given the information available to him.
First, it must be kept in mind that in 1905, when the proposal was made, only four prizes had been awarded, and that it was perhaps not obvious from the list of prize-winners which criteria the Prize Committee would follow in the future. Nobel's will specified that the Peace Prize should be awarded to "the person who shall have done the most or the best work for fraternity between the nations, for the abolition or reduction of standing armies and for the holding and promotion of peace congresses" 15 . In considering his own eligibility for the Prize, d 'économie politique (1860-61) , and he also published several other books and a large number of articles on economic subjects. It was not for his work in economics that he was awarded the Peace Prize, but he believed strongly that free trade would bring the nations of the world to the realization that they had a common interest in world peace; this would gradually lead to disarmament and the abandonment of war. In contrast to Walras, Passy became an ardent public spokesman for peace and contributed an enormous amount of work to the promotion of the international peace movement. It was this work, which made him widely known as "the apostle of peace", that was recognized by the Prize Committee. It is natural to think that Walras must have compared his own eligibility to that of Passy. In contrast to Passy, he could not boast of any active work for the international peace movement, but on the other hand his work on the theory of free markets and -more implicitly -free trade, was based on much more solid foundations than that of Passy. The formulation in the proposal about theoretical work being more important and its results more durable should perhaps be seen in this light.
Thus, Walras' implicit assessment of the probability of winning the Nobel Peace Prize may not have been as irrational as it appears to us today. But this modified judgement of his realism does not of course make it any easier to condone the methods that he used to promote his candidacy.
Walras' programme for peace.
The many curious aspects of this episode should not prevent us from considering whatever true merits there may have been in the arguments advanced in the proposal and especially in the Memorandum. We have seen that the arguments in the Memorandum were not -for reasons unknown -taken seriously in the report that Mr. Hammer wrote for the Prize Committee, and we may perhaps conjecture that the Committee members, who had no expertise in economics, did not try to go behind Hammer's presentation of Walras solely as a pioneer of mathematical economics. It is natural, therefore, to ask whether Walras had in fact deserved a better treatment. Was there a substance to the claim that his own intellectual contribution deserved to be seriously considered for the Nobel Peace Prize?
The justification of the proposal, as set forth in the Memorandum, has two main elements.
The first part of the argument is that free trade is beneficial to world peace; therefore, it is important that the theoretical arguments for free trade are properly understood. "It is commerce which is rapidly rendering war obsolete, by strengthening and multiplying the personal interests which are in natural opposition to it. ... the great extent and rapid increase of international trade, in being the principal guarantee of the peace of the world, is the great permanent security for the uninterrupted progress of the ideas, the institutions, and the character of the human race."
Going back to the text of the Memorandum it is possible to see traces of both sides of the proposition. But on the one hand Walras was far from being the originator of the idea, and it is virtually impossible to argue that our understanding of this particular connection becomes any deeper by having the theory of competitive equilibrium formulated in mathematical language, at least in the way Walras did it 16 .
Ought we to believe that the type of tax reform suggested by Walras would be conducive to peace? One the one hand he clearly has a point when he argues that both tariffs and commodity taxes can discourage trade, and if more trade improves the chances for peace in the world, then a tax reform would improve the prospects for peace. But the other aspect of the reform is the nationalization of land, and here there is reason to have grave doubts about the wisdom of the reform. Wars are fought between governments, and if the government of one country realizes that the land it captures by war is the enemy government's property, it might easily inc rease the incentives for military aggression. On the whole, even if we accept the argument that trade between nations, by increasing interdependence as well as mutual understanding, promotes peace, the particular means to further trade that were suggested by Walras, fail to carry much conviction.
Concluding remarks.
Quite apart from the moral qualms that we may have about Walras' manoeuvres to obtain the Nobel Peace Prize for himself, it is natural for a modern historian of thought to believe that his expectations were completely unrealistic. However, we have seen that they may not have appeared so hopeless to Walras himself, given the information about the Prize that he had in 
